Robert Miner’s understanding of Aquinas on the passions seems to downplay the dominating role of reason, claims Leonard Ferry. Ferry argues that Miner’s general work, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, and particularly his understanding of the morality of the passions as he has interpretively put it in the chapter four of the same work, is an over-statement in regard to the Thomistic spirit and application of the politic and royal rule analogy. In this research work, we have endeavoured to establish the true Thomistic stance as he conceived the passions/reason relation through the lens of politic and royal rule (not generally). It is a reconciliatory effort to pull the extremes (of understanding reason as a controller, commander and its dominating role and passions as having something of their own, a right of opposition or resistance to a lawful command of reason) to the centre while remaining faithful to the Thomistic spirit. This work has made a triad of presentations by first underlining Aquinas’ medieval context which was largely religiously Christian, authoritatively political, morally Christian and scholastically intellectual. First, we have generally presented the views of different commentators assumed to advance either sides of the debate in their interpretive views to show the general and a commonplace tension of passions/reason relation in the thoughts and lives of many. Secondly, we have presented Miner’s main lines of thought and what he deems to be Aquinas’ true position in relation to the employment of this Aristotelean metaphor of the politic and royal power. The presentation and scrutiny of Miner’s work on the analogy of political rule and its interpretation of passions/reason relation has considered Miner’s methodological assumptions. Thirdly, we have presented Ferry’s interpretive stance on the politic and royal rule analogy, and the contentious items he has against Miner. Mindful of the wider context of Aquinas’ Anthropology and Treatise on the passions, we have demonstrated throughout the work, that deviating from his original conceptual position, in regard to the application of politic and royal rule analogy is detrimental to moral conduct of human beings, both at private and public life. We have found out that there has been a long rationalistic-interpretive preference of ‘control,’ ‘command,’ and ‘domination’ against the passionalistic inclination and view of passions as having ‘something of their own’ and ‘right of opposition or right of resistance’ that has widened the rift on passions/reason relation. We have argued that a continued conceptual crisis of this kind translates into real personal and social difficulties and hinder human progress and moral wellbeing. We have concluded by arguing that labouring toward pulling both Miner’s and Ferry’s conceptual views (as representative of the two divergent sides) to a reconciliatory table where both passions and reason stand correct in Aquinas’ thinking is quite urgent and necessary in our contemporary settings. This, we have done by prioritizing Aquinas’ own citations and insights in the Summa Theologiae as it is found in chapter four of this research. As an effort of arbitration, we have demonstrated that this reconciliation must begin by getting ourselves dressed in a true conceptual and epistemic outfit which finally and consequently translates into the practice of virtues.