01601nam a22002897a 450000100060000000300040000600500170001000800410002704000300006809000170009810000280011524501410014326000750028430000180035950500080037751900080038552006930039365000300108665000250111665000300114165000290117165000330120065000310123365000180126494200120128299900170129453472OSt20260707173255.0110110t        xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aKENaSULcKENaSULdKENaSUL  c53472d53468  aCharl du Plessis977674  aCorporate governance reform :ba social constructionist approach to reccuring problems under agency theory's influencecCharl du Plessis  aAuckland Park, South Africa.bAfrican Journal of Business Ethicsc2005  avol.(pg 8-20)  aTOC  aTOC  aA shift in the cultural conception of the firm as production-system to that as investment-system entrenches the institutional logic of agency theory in governance reform. Reform initiative emphasize the separation between management and the board, forensic reporting requirements, and the primacy of stakeholders' entitlement to control and residual gains. Problems associated with this agency logic render reform unable to deliver a broad-based operating environment. The introduction of a version of stakeholder theory, augmented by Knightian uncertainty places the development of an alternative conception of the firm into discourse. Implications for governance reform are considered.   aCorporate Governance9137  aAgency Theory977675  aStakeholder Theory977676  aOwnership Control977677  aKnightian uncertainty977678  aSocial Construction977679  aReform911085  cARTxES  c53472d53468