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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge</title>
    <subTitle>new essays on consciousness and physicalism</subTitle>
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  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Alter, Torin Andrew</namePart>
    <namePart type="date">1963-</namePart>
  </name>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Walter, Sven</namePart>
    <namePart type="date">1974-</namePart>
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  <name type="corporate">
    <namePart>ebrary, Inc</namePart>
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    <place>
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    <place>
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    <publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2007</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
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  <language>
    <languageTerm authority="iso639-2b" type="code">eng</languageTerm>
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  <physicalDescription>
    <form authority="marcform">electronic</form>
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    <extent>x, 349 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.</extent>
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  <tableOfContents>What RoboMary knows / Daniel Dennett -- So this is what it's like : a defense of the ability hypothesis / Laurence Nemirow -- The knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalism / Frank Jackson -- Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? / Torin Alter -- What is this thing you call color : can a totally color-blind person know about color? / Knut Nordby -- What is a phenomenal concept? / Janet Levin -- Phenomenal and perceptual concepts / David Papineau -- Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraint / Joseph Levine -- Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap / David J. Chalmers -- Direct reference and dancing qualia / John Hawthorne -- Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise / Stephen L. White -- Max Black's objection to mind-body identity / Ned Block -- Grasping phenomenal properties / Martine Nida-Rümelin.</tableOfContents>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter.</note>
  <note>Includes bibliographical references and index.</note>
  <note>Electronic reproduction. Palo Alto, Calif. : ebrary, 2009. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.</note>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Phenomenology</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Knowledge, Theory of</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Phenomenalism</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Consciousness</topic>
  </subject>
  <subject authority="lcsh">
    <topic>Materialism</topic>
  </subject>
  <classification authority="lcc">B829.5 .P4432 2007eb</classification>
  <classification authority="ddc" edition="22">121</classification>
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    <titleInfo>
      <title>Philosophy of mind series</title>
    </titleInfo>
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